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I. INTRODUCTION
[The] [1]esbian mother has harmed these children forever. To give
her rights of reasonable visitation so that she can teach them to be
homosexuals, would be the zenith of poor judgment for the
judiciary of this state. Until such time that she can establish, after
years of therapy and demonstrated conduct, that she is no longer a
Family Law Master, State of West Virginia, Region 11; B.A., Youngstown State University,
1983; J.D., The University of Akron School of Law, 1986; Admitted to West Virginia State Bar, 1986.
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lesbian living a life of abomination (see Leviticus 18:22), she
should be totally estopped from contaminating these children.'
Contrary to the beliefs of the justice of the Supreme Court of South Dakota
above, most jurists in the vast majority of states reject the outright disqualification
of a gay or lesbian parent (based solely upon such parent's sexual orientation) from
seeking custody or visitation rights with their minor children? Rather, most states
have "endorsed the requirement that there be a nexus between the conduct of the
parent relied upon by the court and the parent-child relationship."3 In other words,
these courts hold that a parent's sexual orientation should only be considered in a
custody or visitation dispute if it is shown to adversely affect the child's welfare,
and the mere fact that a parent is a homosexual does not alone render him or her
unfit as a parent.4
Courts are often faced with the question of whether the law should be
tolerant of different lifestyles.' In the context of child custody and visitation
disputes, most courts have resolved the dilemmas posed by parents' nonmarital
I Chicoine v. Chicoine, 479 N.W.2d 891, 896 (S.D. 1992) (Henderson, J., specially concurring
in part; dissenting in part).
2 See Appendix to this Article [hereinafter "Appendix"], which contains a review of the case
law of all 50 states, and classifies each state's decision-making framework for child custody or
visitation disputes involving a gay or lesbian parent. Twenty-five states employ a nexus approach,
which requires a showing that the gay or lesbian parent's lifestyle has an adverse affect on the minor
children before such lifestyle can become a reason for denying or restricting custody or visitation. See,
e.g., S.N.E. v. RtL.B., 699 P.2d 875 (Alaska 1985). Seven states employ aper se approach, wherein
a gay or lesbian parent is disqualified from seeking custody or visitation and/or has his or her custody
or visitation restricted solely because of the lifestyle of the gay or lesbian parent, notwithstanding any
showing of an adverse affect on the minor children. See, e.g., Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691 (Va. 1985).
The per se approach was apparently'the approach Justice Henderson attempted to convince his
colleagues to adopt in Chicione, 479 N.W.2d 891. Eight other states do not use the per se approach,
but rather consider the parent's sexual orientation as one of many factors to consider in the dispute.
See Appendix.
S.N.E., 699 P.2d at 878.
4 See, e.g., Bezio v. Patenaude, 410N.E.2d 1207 (Mass. 1980); Guinan v. Guinan, 102 A.D.2d
963 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984).
5 Constant A. v. Paul C.A., 496 A.2d 1, 13 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (Beck, J., dissenting).
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sexual relationships with persons of the opposite sex6 or even a different race7 by
focusing on whether such relationships adversely impacted the children.8 However,
when called upon to apply that same causal relationship standard to homosexual
parents involved in child custody or visitation disputes, the courts have delivered
varying results.9
This Article reviews the expanding case law and commentary across this
nation and discusses the modes of analysis employed by various courts to resolve
whether a parent's sexual orientation should factor into custody or visitation
rulings." In addition to classifying the decision-making framework employed by
such courts," this Article evaluates the myriad of reasons given for continuing to
restrict or deny custody or visitation rights to gay and lesbian parents. 2 With this
background, the Article then focuses on the status of this issue in West Virginia,
including the results of a survey of West Virginia's Family Law Masters. Finally,
this Article offers certain suggestions for practitioners in West Virginia when
6 See, e.g., Bonjour v. Bonjour, 566 P.2d 667 (Alaska 1977); Brooks v. Brooks, 466 A.2d 152
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1983); S.H. v. R.L.H., 289 S.E.2d 186, Syl. Pt. 3 (W. Va. 1982).
See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) and infra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 69-75 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 84-104 and accompanying text.
10 Beyond the scope of this Article are the issues of custody or visitation disputes between gay
or lesbian couples who have adopted children or disputes where a gay or lesbian non-biological party
sues the other gay or lesbian biological parent for custody or visitation. For an examination of those
issues, see, e.g., Yvonne A. Tamayo, Sexuality, Morality and the Law: The Custody Battle of a
Non-Traditional Mother, 45 SYRACUSE L. REV, 853 (1994); Note, Family Law - Visitation Rights -
New York Court of Appeals Refuses to Adopt FunctionalAnalysis in Defining Family Relationships
-Allison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d27 (N.Y. 1991), 105 HARV. L. REV. 941 (1992); Kimberly P.
Carr, Allison D. v. Virginia M.: Neglecting the Best Interests of the Child in a Nontraditional Family,
58 BROOK. L. REv. 1021 (1992). While this Article will note certain cases involving a third party's
claim (e.g., a grandparent) against a gay or lesbian biological parent in a custody or visitation dispute,
the issue of the standing of such third parties is beyond the scope of this Article. On this latter issue,
see, e.g., Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102 (Va. 1995); Barry M. Parsons, Bottoms v. Bottoms:
Erasing the Presumption Favoring a Natural Parent Over Third Parties - What Makes this Mother
Unfit?, 2 GEO. MASON L. REV. 457 (1994); Henry J. Reske, Lesbianism at Center of Custody Dispute,
81 A.B.A. J. 28 (1995). See generally Barbara L. Shapiro, "Non-Traditional" Families in the Courts:
The New Extended Family, 11 L AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 117 (Winter 1993) [hereinafter Extended
Family].
I I See infra notes 22-64 and accompanying text. See also Appendix.
12 See infra notes 84-104 and accompanying text.
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confronted with a custody or visitation dispute involving a gay or lesbian parent.'3
An Appendix of cases from across the nation is included for a quick reference to a
particular state's leading case on these issues.
II. STATE AND FEDERAL COURT DECISIONS
The United States Supreme Court has on at least two occasions provided
specific guidance to the courts of this nation as to the standard of review to be
applied to child custody or visitation disputes involving parents with nontraditional
lifestyles. In Stanley v. 171inois,4 the Court was confronted with the question of
whether an unwed biological father had standing to ask for custody of his minor
child after the death of the biological mother. While noting that society may frown
upon the lack of a nontraditional family setting posed by the father's unwed status,
the Court ruled that society's biases could not overcome the presumption favoring
a natural parent, especially where no proof was presented that the minor child
would be harmed by granting the petition. Absent evidence of any nexus between
the father's unwed status and adverse impact on the child due to such status, the
Court in Stanley suggested that the proper focus should lie with the best interests
of the child and the competency of the father as a parent.'
Despite Stanley's requirement that the parent's nontraditional lifestyle
would be relevant only if there is a clear factual demonstration of a connection
between the parent's lifestyle and its adverse effect on the child's welfare, the Court
was called upon to address the issue again in Palmore v. Sidoti.7 In Palmore, a
caucasian mother married a black male, and her former husband then sought a
change in custody of the parties' minor child, alleging, among other matters, that
the child would be stigmatized by being raised in an interracial household. The
lower courts apparently applied what amounted to an irrebuttable presumption that
13 See infra notes 105-141 and accompanying text.
14 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
15 Id. at 657-58.
16 Id. at 658.
17 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
Is Id. at 430-31.
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the mother's new lifestyle would be harmful to the child and awarded custody to the
father.'9
In reversing the lower courts' decisions, the Court in Palmore recognized
that it could not control society's disfavor upon interracial households. However,
the Court refused to give effect to such biases by upholding the award of custody
to the father.2" While its decision was grounded upon the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the Court once
again rejected the presumptive approach that a nontraditional lifestyle would
adversely affect the child 2' It would therefore appear that to adhere to the Court's
rationale in both Stanley and Palmore, courts should limit their review of a parent's
behavior or nontraditional lifestyle to whether the behavior directly affects the
parent's minor children.
A. Per Se Approach
Notwithstanding the guidance from the United States Supreme Court, a
minority of states still apply a rigid decision-making analysis when confronted with
child custody or visitation disputes involving a gay or lesbian parent. These courts
apply the equivalent of an irrebuttable presumption that a homosexual parent is
unfit to have custody or visitation due to the parent's lifestyle, without regard to any
proof of harm to the children.
For example, in Roe v. Roe,22 the Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed a
child custody dispute wherein the father was involved in an active homosexual
relationship in the same household as the parties' child.' The trial court awarded
partial custody to the father, but conditioned his award of custody on the father's
19 Id. at 431.
20 Id. at 433.
21 Id. Beyond the scope of this Article is the argument that homosexual individuals involved
in custody determinations are a "suspect class" entitled to heightened scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. For a discussion of that issue, see David S. Dooley,
Immoral Because They're Bad, Bad Because They're Wrong: Sexual Orientation and Presumptions
of Parental Unfitness in Custody Disputes, 26 CAL. W.L. REv. 395 (1990); Note, Custody Denials to
Parents in Same-Sex Relationships: An Equal Protection Analysis, 102 HARV. L. REV. 617 (1989).
2 324 S.E.2d 691 (Va. 1985).
23 Id. at 692.
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not sharing the same bedroom with any male lover while the child was present.24
The Virginia Supreme Court reversed and vested sole custody in the mother, stating
that:
The father's continuous exposure of the child to his immoral and
illicit relationship renders him an unfit and improper custodian as
a matter of law .... [W]e have no hesitancy in saying that the
conditions under which this child must live daily are not only
unlawful but also impose an intolerable burden upon her by reason
of the social condemnation attached to them, which will inevitably
afflict her relationships with her peers and with the community at
large.... The father's unfitness is manifested by his willingness
to impose his burden upon her in exchange for his own
gratification.'
This type ofjudicially imposed moralit requires no proof of harm to the child and
renders any attempt by a gay or lesbian parent to show otherwise a useless
endeavor."
24 Id. The trial court found both the mother and father to be fit, competent, and devoted
custodians. Id.
25 Id at 694 (citations omitted). Not only did the court vest custody with the mother, but it also
ordered a cessation of visitations in the father's home, or in the presence of his male lover, while his
current living arrangements continued. Roe, 324 S.E.2d at 694.
26 The court in Roe relied upon precedent which suggests that "[tihe moral climate in which
children are to be raised is an important consideration for the court in determining custody.... An
illicit relationship to which minor children are exposed cannot be condoned." Id. at 693 (citing Brown
v. Brown, 237 S.E.2d 89, 91 (Va. 1977)).
27 The court in Roe distinguished its earlier ruling in Doe v. Doe, 284 S.E.2d 799 (Va. 1981).
Doe involved an attempt by a father and his new wife to terminate the parental rights of the biological
lesbian mother. Doe, 284 S.E.2d at 800. The court denied the adoption and declined to hold that every
lesbian mother or gay father was per se an unfit parent. Doe, 284 S.E.2d at 806. The Roe court
distinguished Doe on the grounds that the impact of a day-to-day custody situation was not presented
as in Roe and termination in an adoption case was final whereas custody determinations are subject to
change upon different conditions. Roe, 324 S.E.2d at 694. The Roe court further explained that "[w]e
refused to terminate all parental rights of the lesbian mother in Doe, but we stopped far short of finding
her a fit and proper custodian for her son, or even of approving his visitations in her home, while her
existing living arrangements continued." Roe, 324 S.E.2d at 694.
[Vol. 100:107
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The unbending decision-making espoused by the Roe court is followed by
six other jurisdictions.28 These jurisdictions apparently believe that children's
exposure to the homosexual lifestyle of their parent will harm the children, because
of society's stigmatization of the household or because of the fear that the children
will develop into homosexuals themselves (without the necessity of evidence to
support such a belief).29 The arguments regarding stigmatization fly in the face of
the dictates of Palmore.3° Moreover, the claim that children will become
homosexuals has been roundly discounted by various studies which document that
"the incidence of same-sex orientation among the children of gays and lesbians
occurs as randomly and in the same proportion as it does among children in the
general population .... 31
B. Middle Ground Analysis
Realizing that the per se or irrebuttable presumption standard fails to
comport with an actual analysis of the best interests of the child and/or an analysis
of the competency of the parenting abilities of a gay or lesbian parent, a significant
group of states reject theper se approach, but fail to go so far as to require that the
homosexual parent's lifestyle adversely impacts the child's welfare. Rather, these
jurisdictions adopt a middle ground approach, which, unfortunately, leads to
varying results even within their own jurisdictions.
28 See Appendix.
29 See, e.g., S. v. S., 608 S.W.2d 64, 66 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980) (expressing the concern that the
child might have difficulty in developing a heterosexual relationship in the future due to exposure to
his parent's homosexual lifestyle); S.E.G. v. R.A.G., 735 S.W.2d 164, 166 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987)
(stating that "[h]omosexuality is not openly accepted or widespread. We wish to protect the children
from peer pressure, teasing, and possible ostracizing they may encounter as a result of the 'alternative
life style' their mother has chosen."). See also Dailey v. Dailey, 635 S.W.2d 391, 394 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1981) (relying upon a psychologist who testified that "homosexuality would be more likely to be
learned by one who was exposed to it than by an individual who was not.... [H]omosexuality is a
learned trait and it would be very difficult for [the child] to learn and approximate sex role
identification from a homosexual environment.").
30 See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
31 Steve Susoeff, Assessing Children's Best Interests When a Parent Is Gay or Lesbian:
Toward a Rational Custody Standard, 32 UCLA L. REV. 852, 882 (1985). See also Note, The Avowed
Lesbian Mother and Her Right to Child Custody: A Constitutional Challenge That Can No Longer Be
Denied, 12 SAN DiEGo L. Rav. 799, 861 (1975) (stating that "[m]ost homosexuals have had parents
who are exclusively heterosexual, or primarily so"). See also infra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
19971
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Representative of this middle ground approach is the case of Constant A.
v. Paul C.A.,32 which involved a lesbian mother's petition for expanded custody
with her minor children?3  While the court rejected the argument that
homosexuality per se is a basis for denying visitation or partial custody to a parent,
it found that it is a relevant consideration in the dispute.34
The court further held that "where there is a custody dispute between
members of a traditional family environment and one of homosexual composition,
the presumption of regularity applies to the traditional relationship and the burden
of proving no adverse effect of the homosexual relationship falls on the person
advocating it."35  The court cited as its reasons for applying this rebuttable
presumption the following: the homosexual relationship is illegal due to sodomy
statutes;36 homosexual marriages are not permitted and are therefore not to be
equated with heterosexual relations;37 the behavior of all persons in the home of the
children falls within the purview of the court;38 the children will need counseling
to deal with their mother's lifestyle (since the mother is in counseling); and illicit
heterosexual relationships should not be condoned so the same should be said for
a lesbian relationship.39 The court specifically refused to adopt the nexus approach
of other courts, where no consideration is to be given to the sexual preference
unless concrete harm to the child is proven.40
Seven years after the decision in Constant A., the Pennsylvania appellate
court was again faced with an identical issue. In Blew v. Verta,4' the court found
32 496 A.2d 1 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985).
33 Id. at 2.
34 Id. at 9.
35 Id. at 5 (footnote omitted).
36 Id. at 4-5.
37 Constant A., 496 A.2d at 6.
38 Id. at 8.
39 Id. at 9.
40 Id. at 10 (citing Bezio v. Patenaude, 410 N.E.2d 1207 (Mass. 1980) and D.H. v. J.H., 418
N.E.2d 286 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981)).
41 617 A.2d 31 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992). Interestingly, the dissenting justice in Constant A.
(Justice Beck), is the author of the majority opinion in Blew.
[Vol. 100:107
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that the lower court's reliance on the Constant A. decision to restrict a lesbian
mother's visitation rights was misplaced since the trial court based a finding of
detriment to the child not on the mother's homosexual relationship, "but rather on
other individuals [sic] reaction to the mother's relationship.' ' 2 The decisions in
these two Pennsylvania cases tend to illustrate the drawbacks to the middle ground
(also known as the rebuttable presumption) approach.
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma also applies a middle ground approach,
rejecting the per se analysis but falling short of adopting the nexus standard. In
MJ.P. v. J.G.P.,43 the court noted that a best interests standard is applied in other
states' cases involving homosexual parents and that the determining factor should
be the effect the homosexual relationship has on the child. While on its surface
this analysis might sound like the nexus approach which requires harm to the child
to be shown before the homosexual parent's lifestyle becomes relevant, an
examination of the "harm" the court found in MJ.P. reveals that the burden to
disprove such "harm" still lies with the homosexual parent.
The MJ.P. court found that the child was harmed by the mother's lesbian
relationship based upon the following "evidence" from a psychiatrist who testified
at the trial: (1) as the child aged, he might be teased by people commenting on his
mother's homosexuality; (2) it is in a child's best interest to be taught the prevailing
morals of society, and a homosexual lifestyle is immoral; (3) the child would
eventually have to choose between society's pressures that his mother's lifestyle is
immoral and his mother's belief that there is nothing immoral with such
relationship; and (4) the child might have problems during early adolescence with
sex identification roles.4" Despite a total lack of showing of any particularized harm
to the child in the case at bar, the court transferred custody to the father.46 This
decision is even more confusing when one considers that the same psychiatrist upon
which the court relied to find that the child was "harmed" also testified about a
42 Id. at 35. The child in Blew was embarrassed, confused and angry over other people's
reactions to his mother's lesbian relationship, but the court in Blew refused to yield to those prejudices,
posing this query: "Would a court restrict a handicapped parent's custody because other people made
remarks about the handicapped parent which embarrassed, confused and angered the child? We think
not." Id.
43 640 P.2d 966 (Okla. 1982).
44 Id. at 968. The court stated that if the "effect" is found to be detrimental to the child, then
the custody modification should be granted to the heterosexual parent. Id.
45 Id. at 969.
46 Id.
1997]
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study involving homosexual and heterosexual mothers which revealed "'essentially
no difference in the development of the children or the relationships between
mothers and their children or generally the problems that the mothers were having
in raising their children."' 47
C. The Nexus Requirement
Perhaps due to a dissatisfaction with the harshness oftheper se approach
and the unpredictability of the middle ground analysis, at least twenty-five states
apply what has been referred to as a nexus requirement. In the nexus approach, the
gay or lesbian parent's lifestyle must be shown to have an adverse impact upon the
child before the issue of the parent's lifestyle becomes a relevant consideration in
the dispute.48 The burden to prove the adverse impact on the child rests with the
heterosexual parent claiming the homosexual parent's lifestyle is producing such
harm. 49
One of the leading cases adopting the nexus standard is Bezio v.
Patenaude5 In Bezio, the trial court refused a lesbian mother's petition to regain
custody of her minor children from their court ordered custodial guardian on the
sole basis that the lesbian environment would adversely affect the welfare of the
47 MJ.P., 640 P.2d. at 968 (citing Mildred D. Pagelow, Heterosexual and Lesbian Single
Mothers: A Comparison of Problems, Coping, and Solutions, 5(3) J. HOMOSEXUALITY 189-204
(1981); Hitchens, SocialAttitudes, Legal Standards and Personal Trauma in Child Custody Cases,
5(1) J. HOMOSEXUALITY 89-96 (1979/1980)). The psychiatrist also "opined a son raised in a
homosexual home is not more likely to become a practicing homosexual than a son raised by a single
woman living alone." Id. at 968-69.
48 See Appendix.
49 See, e.g., In re Diehl, 18 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 1128, 1129 (Ill. App. Ct. 2 Dist., No.
2-90-1217, 11-22-91) ("We conclude that [the heterosexual father] has not borne his burden of
demonstrating that the threat of serious endangerment necessary to restrict [the lesbian mother's]
visitation with her daughter.").
50 410 N.E.2d 1207 (Mass. 1980). The Bezio decision is frequently cited by other courts,
regardless of the standard of analysis employed. See, e.g., Pleasant v. Pleasant, 628 N.E.2d 633, 641
(Ill. App. 1 Dist. 1993); Johnson v. Schlotman, 502 N.W.2d 831, 838 (N.D. 1993); M.J.P. v. J.G.P.,
640 P.2d 966, 967 (Okla. 1982); Constant A. v. Paul, 496 A.2d 1, 9 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985); Stroman
v. Williams, 353 S.E.2d 704, 706 (S.C. Ct. App. 1987). Bezio is also frequently the subject of review
by the commentators. See, e.g., Susoeff, supra note 31, at 896; David M. Rosenblum, Custody Rights
of Gay and Lesbian Parents, 36 VILL. L. REV. 1665, 1687 n.133 (1991); Courtney R. Baggett, Sexual
Orientation: Should It Affect Child Custody Rulings, 16 LAw&PSYCH. REv. 189, 194 (1992); Donald
H. Stone, The Moral Dilemma: Child Custody When One Parent Is Homosexual or Lesbian - An
Empirical Study, 23 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 711, 731 (1989).
[Vol. 100:107
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children."1 Based on expert testimony adduced at the trial that homosexuality per
se is irrelevant to parenting ability,"2 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
reversed the trial court holding that
A finding that a parent is unfit to further the welfare of the child
must be predicated upon parental behavior which adversely affects
the child. The State may not deprive parents of custody of their
children 'simply because their households fail to meet the ideals
approved by the community... (or) simply because the parents
embrace ideologies or pursue life-styles at odds with the
average.' 53
The court further held that the nexus standard could not be satisfied by judicial
notice that a lesbian household would harm the child. Thus, the court clearly
rejected the per se approach the trial court apparently employed. 4
The Supreme Court of Alaska also adopted the nexus approach in S.NE. v.
RL.B5 when it stated that "the scope of judicial inquiry is limited to facts directly
affecting the child's well-being[,] [with] ... the requirement that there be a nexus
between the conduct of the parent relied on by the court and the parent-child
relationship." '56 The court intimated that the lower court entertained an unnecessary
amount of evidence which established the mother was a lesbian, but failed to elicit
any. evidence showing that her lesbianism adversely effected the child. The court
concluded that "it is impermissible to rely on any real or imagined social stigma
attached to Mother's status as a lesbian."'57
51 Bezio, 410 N.E.2d at 1215.
52 Id. at 1215-16.
53 Id. at 1216 (citing Custody of a Minor, 393 N.E.2d 379, 383 (Mass. 1979) and M.P. v.S.P.,
404 A.2d 1256 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979)).
54 Id. at 1216.
55 699 P.2d 875 (Alaska 1985).
56 Id. at 878. The court noted that circumstances such as a parent living in an adulterous
relationship, bearing children out of wedlock, living in unstable relationships, and even the mental
health of a parent is not relevant absent any indication of adverse effects on the child. Id. (citations
omitted).
57 Id. at 879 (citing Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984)).
1997]
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One cautionary note regarding courts' approval of the nexus standard comes
from a concurring opinion in a South Carolina case which applied this standard. In
Stroman v. Williams,.8 a concurring justice wrote that "[n]o moral judgment by us
has been necessary because there is no evidence that her lifestyle had any relevancy
to the welfare of the child .... We are not in the business of gratuitously judging
the private lives of other people."59
While courts may not explicitly judge the private lives of litigants, the
morality of a parent's lifestyle is at least implicitly considered by several courts that
follow the nexus approach, including South Carolina." For example, in Maradie
v. Maradie,1 a Florida appellate court suggested that a trial court can consider a
parent's sexual conduct in judging moral fitness, but in considering such moral
fitness, the focus should be placed on whether the parent's behavior has a direct
impact on the welfare of the child.62
The advice of one New Jersey appellate court applying a nexus approach
regarding the concern over morals is particularly revealing. In MP. v. S.P.,6 the
court stated,
If [the lesbian mother] retains custody, it may be that because the
community is intolerant of her differences these girls may
sometimes have to bear themselves with greater than ordinary
fortitude. But this does not necessarily portend that their moral
welfare or safety will be jeopardized. It is just as reasonable to
expect that they will emerge better equipped to search out their
own standards of right and wrong, better able to perceive that the
majority is not always correct in its moral judgments, and better
able to understand the importance of conforming their beliefs to
58 353 S.E.2d 704 (S.C. Ct. App. 1987).
59 Id. at 707.
60 See Marshall v. Marshall, 320 S.E.2d 44 (S.C. Ct. App. 1984).
61 22 FAM. L. REP. (DNA) 1470 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App., No. 95-4068, 7/16/96).
62 Id.
63 404 A.2d 1256 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979).
[Vol. 100:107
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the requirements of reason and tested knowledge, not the
constraints of currently popular sentiment or prejudice."
D. States Which Have Not Addressed the Issue
Ten states have yet to specifically address whether a parent's sexual
orientation should be considered in a child custody or visitation dispute.
Notwithstanding the lack of reported opinions involving homosexual parents in
these jurisdictions, certain decisions may lend guidance to a prediction of the
possible results in such states. For example, in Montana, one legal commentator
notes that while no state supreme court precedent exists to guide practitioners, 5 the
Montana Supreme Court has held that it would "not look favorably upon district
courts that rely upon any unfounded fears that may be brought into the
courtroom." The author notes that Montana's high court "restricted the scope of
judicial consideration to the parent's behavior as it directly affected his child."'67
If followed, this precedent in Montana suggests that a nexus approach would be
applied in child custody or visitation disputes involving a gay or lesbian parent."8
64 Id. at 1263. The court stated that if it were to strip the lesbian mother of custody due to fears
regarding moral development, it would send the wrong message to the children, the parties, and other
litigants. "Instead of courage and the precept that people of integrity do not shrink from bigots, it
counsels the easy option of shirking difficult problems and following the course of expedience ....
[I]t diminishes their regard for the rule of human behavior, everywhere accepted, that we do not
forsake those to whom we are indebted for love and nurture merely because they are held in low esteem
by others." Id.
65 Deirdre Runnette, Judicial Discretion and the Homosexual Parent: How Montana Courts
Are and Should Be Considering a Parent's Sexual Orientation in Contested Custody Cases, 57 MONT.
L. REV. 177, 180-81 (1996).
66 Id. at 202 (reviewing In re Marriage of D.F.D., 862 P.2d 368 (1993)). In re Marriage of
D.F.D. involved an attempt by a custodial mother to severely restrict the visitation rights of her former
husband, who had exhibited past tendencies as a transvestite. In re Marriage of D.F.D., 862 P.2d at
369. Despite evidence which showed that the father's behavior posed no threat of harm to the child,
the trial court granted the mother's requests because the father's conduct might harm the child. In re
Marriage of D.F.D., 862 P.2d at 370-71.
67 Runnette, supra note 65, at 203.
68 Runnette argues persuasively in her Article that the decision in In re Marriage of D.F.D.
applies a nexus approach and that "mere presumptions will not suffice to establish a nexus." ld. at 204.
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In Smith-Helstrom v. Yonker,69 a mother engaged in a nonmarital sexual
relationship subsequent to a divorce (in which she was awarded custody of her
minor child), prompting her ex-husband to petition for a custody change based in
part on the wife's new relationship. 7° The father failed to present any evidence that
the wife's relationship harmed the children. 7' The Supreme Court of Nebraska
reversed the trial court's award of custody to the father, stating that while evidence
of the moral fitness of the parents, including sexual conduct, can be considered as
a factor, absent a showing that the mother's cohabitation adversely affected the
child, no weight would be assigned to such factor.72 While this decision may not
specifically adopt a nexus approach, it clearly rejects the notion that a parent's
nontraditional lifestyle will in and of itself act as a detriment to the parent in the
custody or visitation dispute.
Decisions in other states, if their rationale are followed, also suggest that
a nexus approach would be employed, or, at the very least, the burden of proof
would be placed upon the party claiming a parent's lifestyle is relevant to the
proceeding. For example, the Court of Appeals of Idaho implicitly approved the
nexus approach when it ruled that a mother's post-divorce cohabitation with another
man is relevant only upon a stated connection between the mother's cohabitation
and some present demonstrative harm to the child's welfare!3 The Supreme Court
of Delaware also addressed the issue of a parent's post-divorce adulterous
69 544 N.W.2d 93 (Neb. 1996).
70 Id. at 96. The original divorce decree prohibited the mother from cohabiting with men to
whom she was not married. Id. at 101.
71 Id. at 101.
72 Id. Nebraska courts have consistently held that a party's sexual conduct, including
nonmarital cohabitation in the same home as where the children reside, does not justify a custody
change unless the children are adversely affected by the living arrangements or are exposed to any
sexual activity. See Kennedy v. Kennedy, 380 N.W.2d 300 (Neb. 1986); Krohn v. Krohn, 347 N.W.2d
869 (Neb. 1984). West Virginia has similar precedent, and when confronted with a case involving an
alleged lesbian mother, the West Virginia court applied a nexus requirement. See infra notes 114-119
and accompanying text.
73 Roeh v. Roeh, 746 P.2d 1016, 1019 (Idaho 1987), cited with approval in Craig v. McBride,
639 P.2d 303, 311 (Alaska 1982) ("[E]vidence of the life-style, habits, or character of a custody
claimant is relevant only to the extent that it may be shown to affect the person's relationship to the
child."). The court in Roeh reversed the award of custody to the father since the mother's subsequent
cohabitation "was not shown to have any nexus with the child's best interests." Roeh, 746 P.2d at
1018.
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cohabitation inA.S. v. M.S.74 The court held that it is proper to consider a parent's
adulterous conduct as it affects the proper development of a child's moral character,
but that the burden of showing harmful conduct lies with the parent asserting such
conduct is relevant.'
The recent decision of a Hawaii trial court invalidating that state's law
prohibiting gay or lesbian couples from applying for marriage licenses, also
suggests that a nexus approach would be employed in a custody or visitation dispute
involving a gay or lesbian parent. In Baehr v. Miike,76 the trial court in Hawaii
looked extensively at the issue of the harm that would occur if the law was
invalidated, and it ruled that the state's interest would not be harmed by granting the
petition.' Although the decision is on appeal, the trial court presumably suggested
that it would be tolerant of gay or lesbian parents involved in custody or visitation
disputes, particularly if their conduct produces no harm to the children.
Gauging the result in the state of New Hampshire is uncertain. In In re
Opinion of the Justices,78 the New Hampshire Supreme Court upheld its state law
prohibiting adoptions by homosexuals. Whether this decision forecasts troubling
signals for gay or lesbian parents involved in child custody or visitation disputes is
unclear. Besides New Hampshire, Florida is the only other state which by statute
bars adoptions by homosexuals.79 Notwithstanding such statute, recent decisions
by the Florida courts have applied a nexus approach to homosexual parents in
custody disputes.80
E. Application of Decision-Making Framework
Regardless of which analysis courts employ, the results for gay or lesbian
parents continue to be dictated by which standard is employed. Not surprisingly,
of the fifteen cases in the seven jurisdictions employing the per se analysis (as cited
74 435 A.2d 721 (Del. 1981).
75 Id. at 725-26.
76 23 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2001 (Hawaii Cir. Ct. 1st. Cir., No 91-1394, 12/3/96).
77 Id. at 2010-11.
78 530 A.2d 21 (N.H. 1987).
79 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042(3) (West 1997).
so See, e.g., Maradie v. Maradie, 22 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 1470 (Fla. 1st Dist. App., No. 95-
4068, 7/16/96).
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in the Appendix to this Article), decisions in fourteen of those cases were favorable
to the relief sought by the heterosexual parent.8 Similarly, in those eight
jurisdictions applying a middle ground analysis, eleven of thirteen decisions were
favorable to the relief sought by the heterosexual parent.82 Relief sought by gay and
lesbian parents received strong support in those jurisdictions requiring a nexus
between the parent's lifestyle and the effects on the children. Of the fifty-one cases
in the twenty-five nexus jurisdictions, the gay and lesbian parents prevailed in
thirty-nine of those cases. 3 Overall, forty-two of the seventy-eight cases cited in
the Appendix in the forty states which employ one of the three standards of review
were favorable to the relief sought by the gay or lesbian parent. The most common
reasons cited for continuing to deny or restrict custody or visitation to a gay or
lesbian parent can be summarized by the following representative cases.
1. Societal Stigmatization
In S. v. S.,s' the Court of Appeals of Kentucky relied upon the testimony of
examining psychologists who reported that because of the social stigma attached to
homosexuality, the child would be teased, embarrassed, and isolated8 5 Because of
this potential for future harm, the court awarded custody to the heterosexual parent,
quoting the psychologist's report stating that "[t]here would seem to me to be no
81 The only case arguably favorable to the gay parent in the seven per se jurisdictions is
Woodruffv. Woodruff, 260 S.E.2d 775 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979). In Woodruff, the court permitted the gay
father overnight visitation with his child, but severely restricted the visits by prohibiting the visits to
occur around the father's male lover or any other males. Id. at 777.
82 Only the decisions in A. v. A., 514 P.2d 358 (Or. App. 1973) (granting custody to gay father
but to be supervised by juvenile authorities) and Blew v. Verta, 617 A.2d 31 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992)
(restricting lesbian mother's custody not warranted) can be construed as favorable of those 13 cases
listed in the Appendix under the middle ground approach.
83 Twelve of the 51 cases in the nexus jurisdictions were favorable to the heterosexual parents,
including: Charpentier v. Charpentier, 536 A.2d 948 (Conn. 1988); Vanderels v. Vanderels, Civ. File
No. 85-DR-3445-2 (Ga. Super. 1987); In re Marriage of Martins, 645 N.E.2d 567 (II1. App. 2d 1995);
In re Marriage of Williams, 563 N.E.2d 1195 (I11. App. 3d 1990); D.H. v. J.H., 418 N.E.2d 286 (Ind.
Ct App. 1981); Lundin v. Lundin, 563 So.2d 1273 (La. Ct. App. 1990); DiStefano v. DiStefano, 401
N.Y.S.2d 636 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978); Roberts v. Roberts, 489 N.E.2d 1067 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985);
Glover v. Glover, 586 N.E.2d 159 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990); Chicoine v. Chicoine, 479 N.W.2d 891, 892
(S.D. 1992); Kallas v. Kallas, 614 P.2d 641 (Utah 1980); Hertzler v. Hertzler, 908 P.2d 946 (Wyo.
1995).
84 608 S.W.2d 64 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).
85 Id. at 66.
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rational reason for purposely submitting a child to these additional and potentially
debilitating influences. 8 6
2. Child Will Become Homosexual
The court in S. v. S. also relied upon another common fear in stripping
custody from a lesbian mother. The court intimated that the child "may have
difficulties in achieving a fulfilling heterosexual identity of her own in the future."87
An appellate court in Tennessee also appears to share the view of the S. v. S. court.
The Tennessee court relied upon a psychiatrist's testimony that "homosexuality is
a learned trait and it would be very difficult for [a child] to learn and approximate
sex role identification from a homosexual environment.' 8 More bluntly, an
appellate court in Missouri restricted a lesbian mother's visitation rights because
"[t]he court does not need to wait.., till the damage is done. If the child's situatioh
is such that damage is likely to occur as her sexual awareness develops with the
approach of young womanhood, the court may in a proper case remove her from the
unwholesome environment."89
3. Child Will Contract AIDS
In H.J.B. v. P. W., the noncustodial mother sought a change in custody due
in part to the gay father's lifestyle and the fact that he tested positive for the Human
86 Id. See also Thigpen v. Carpenter, 730 S.W.2d 510, 514 (Ark. Ct. App. 1987) (stating that
homosexuality is generally socially unacceptable and the children could be exposed to ridicule and
teasing by other children); N.K.M. v. L.E.M., 606 S.W.2d 179, 186 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that
while homosexuality might be acceptable to the mother, "yet who would place a child in a milieu
where she might be inclined toward it? She may thereby be condemned, in one degree or another, to
sexual disorientation, to social ostracism, contempt and unhappiness."); David L. Weiden,
Stigmatization and Discrimination: Visitation Rights of Noncustodial Homosexual Parents and the
Effect ofParental Deprivation on Children, 69 DEN. U. L. REV. 513, 530-32 (1992); Rosenblum, supra
note 50, at 1677-80. See also supra note 26 and accompanying text.
87 S. v. S., 608 S.W.2d at 66.
88 Dailey v. Dailey, 635 S.W.2d 291, 394 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981). See also Susoeff, supra note
31, at 881-84; Rosenblum, supra note 50, at 1675-77; Weiden, supra note 86, at 525-27; Dooley,
supra note 21, at 421-22.
89 L. v. D., 630 S.W.2d 240,245 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (citing N.K.M. v. L.E.M., 606 S.W.2d
179, 186 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980)).
90 628 So. 2d 753 (Ala. Civ. App. 1993).
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Immuno-deficiency Virus ("HIV") In granting the mother's petition, the court
focused on the fact that the father concealed his gay lifestyle and his medical
condition "which could have a significant bearing on the... best interests of the
child.... "92 Apparently the court's fear regarding the father's HIV status was all
that was required to strip him of custody, since no actual evidence was presented
as to how his medical condition affected the child.9"
4. Moral Development of Child
In J.P. v. P. W.,9 the court restricted the gay father's visitation so that he
could not visit his children in the presence of his male lover or any other males in
his household. The court stated that it could not ignore the impact of the father's
lifestyle on the child's development of morals, values, character, and virtue during
the child's formative years.95 Related to the argument that a parent's homosexual
lifestyle will harm the moral development of a child is the proposition that since
homosexuals engage in illegal sexual conduct by virtue of states' sodomy laws, their
illegal conduct can be considered in a custody dispute as an improper example to
91 Id. at 754-55.
92 Id. at 755.
93 Relying on studies that demonstrate that HIV cannot be contacted through casual contact
between household members, various courts and commentators have roundly criticized the "fear of
AIDS" as a ground to deny or restrict custody or visitation to a homosexual parent. See, e.g., Stewart
v. Stewart, 521 N.E.2d 956 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that termination of AIDS-infected father's
visitation rights was not required where medical evidence and studies at time of trial showed AIDS was
not transmitted through everyday household contact); North v. North, 648 A.2d 1025 (Md. App. 1994)
(expressing that the denial of overnight visitation'to gay father infected with HIV not supported by the
evidence since, if there was a fear of transmission to the child, it could as easily occur during daylight
hours); Doe v. Roe, 526 N.Y.S.2d 718 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988) (holding that a gay father who petitioned
for visitation was not required to undergo AIDS test since overwhelming weight and consensus of
medical opinion is that the HIV virus is not spread casually, with no risk of infection through close
personal contact or sharing of household functions); Rosenblum, supra note 50, at 1682-84; Dooley,
supra note 21, at 422-23; Weiden, supra note 86, at 528-30; Claudia G. Catalono, Annotation, Child
Custody and Visitation Rights of Person Infected with AIDS, Annot., 86 A.L.R.4th 211 (1991).
94 772 S.W.2d 786 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
95 Id. at 789. The court in J.P. concluded by announcing that "[w]e see no salutary effect for
the young child by exposing him to the [father's] miasmatic moral standards." Id.
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the children regarding respect for the law.96 A concurring justice in Thigpen Y.
Carpenter97 noted that the people of Arkansas have declared through legislative
enactment that sodomy is immoral, unacceptable, and criminal conduct. Therefore,
the court can consider this clear public policy in a custody case particularly "where,
as here, the [lesbian mother] has declared her fixed determination to continue that
course of illegal conduct for the rest of her life, in a home in which the children also
reside, and to justify her conduct to her children if and when they find her out."98
5. Child May Be Molested
Certain courts have prohibited gay and lesbian parents from exercising their
visitation rights in the presence of their homosexual lovers or friends implicitly due
to the fear that the children might be sexually molested. For example, in In re J.S.
&'C.," the court entered such a restriction on the gay father's visitation and relied
on testimony that "it is possible that these children upon reaching puberty would be
subject to either overt or covert homosexual seduction ... ."" In one of the earliest
reported opinions on the subject of homosexual parents involved in custody or
visitation disputes, a Pennsylvania court granted the heterosexual mother the sole
discretion to determine the gay father's visitation rights. The court stated that "[w]e
think the cumulative weight of the evidence is to the effect that the children in the
96 In L. v. D., the court noted that homosexual practices have been condemned since the
beginning of recorded history, that deviate sexual intercourse with another person of the same sex is
a crime (in Missouri), and that homosexual practices are not within the privacy of marriage (as
discussed in Griswald v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)). L. v. D., 630 S.W.2d 243 (Mo. Ct. App.
1982).
97 730 S.W.2d 510 (Ark. Ct. App. 1987).
98 Id. at 514 (Cracraft, J., concurring). See infra note 131 and accompanying text. See also
Weiden, supra note 86, at 533-35; Dooley, supra note 21, at 414-17; Rosenblum, supra note 50, at
1673-77.
99 324 A.2d 90 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1974), affd, 362 A.2d 54 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1976).
100 Id. at 96. Several other courts have severely restricted visitation rights of gay and lesbian
parents at least tacitly approving the argument that the children would be harmed if left in the presence
of the parent's homosexual lovers or friends. See, e.g., Irish v. Irish, 300 N.W.2d 739 (Mich. Ct..App.
1981); White v. Thompson, 569 So. 2d 1181, 1185 (Miss. 1990); Hertzler v. Hertzler, 908 P.2d 946
(Wyo. 1996); Weiden, supra note 86, at 528; Susoeff, supra note 31, at 880-81; Rosenblum, supra
note 50, at 1684 -1685.
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custody of [the father] may be exposed to improper conditions and undesirable
influences.'. 1
6. Nexus Proven
In In re Marriage of Martins0 2 the court applied a nexus approach to find
that children were adversely affected by their lesbian mother's lifestyle.' 3 In
reaching the conclusion to transfer custody to the father, the court relied on facts at
trial showing that the mother spent less time with the children while she was
pursuing her new lifestyle; that she had numerous roommates in the household
which bothered the children and created an unstable environment; and that the
children developed behavioral problems and had to undergo counseling after the
mother acknowledged her lesbianism to them. 4
III. ANALYSIS OF ISSUE UNDER WEST VIRGINIA LAW
A. Family Law Masters Survey
Although the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has issued at least
one opinion directly involving a lesbian parent in a custody dispute,'0 5 a recent
survey of West Virginia's Family Law Masters suggests that the court may likely
be faced with the issue again.' Of the eighteen Masters who responded to the
1o Com. ex. rel. Bachman v. Bradley, 91 A.2d 379, 382 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1952). The trial court
in Bradley also restricted the father's visitations, although less severely than the appellate court, noting
that "realizing [the father's] sexual tendencies, the Court is reluctant to have any male companions
living at the house when the children spend the night with the [father]." Id. at 381.
102 645 N.E.2d 567 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
103 Id. at 574.
104 Id. See also Chicoine v. Chicoine, 479 N.W.d 891 (S.D. 1992). In Chicoine, the court
applied a nexus standard of review but also found that the children were harmed by the lesbian
mother's lifestyle. The facts adduced at trial showed that the mother and her lover were affectionate
toward each other in the presence of the children, the children were taken to gay bars on at least two
occasions, and the children were permitted to sleep in the same bed as the mother and her lover.
Chicoine, 479 N.W.2d at 893-94.
105 Rowsey v. Rowsey, 329 S.E.2d 57 (W. Va. 1985).
106 WEST VIRGINIA FAMILY LAW MASTERs SURVEY (1996) (unpublished survey) (on file with
author). Survey conducted by the author of this Article by mall from Jan. 17, 1996 to Feb. 9, 1996
[hereinafter SURVEY OF MASTERs]. All 26 Family Law Masters (including the author) received a copy
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survey, thirteen have presided over at least one case involving a gay or lesbian
parent.' °7 All of the responding Masters were unanimous in the belief that a gay or
lesbian parent is notper se disqualified from seeking custody or visitation of their
minor children due solely to such parent's lifestyle.1°8 Thirteen of the eighteen
Masters believe that the fact a parent is gay or lesbian is one of many factors to
consider in a best interest analysis, whereas fourteen of the eighteen Masters believe
the parent's lifestyle would become irrelevant where the parent's lifestyle is not
shown to adversely affect the children. 9
Predominantly, lesbian mothers as opposed to gay fathers were involved in
custody or visitation disputes."0 The number of disputes were evenly divided
between original divorce proceedings and modification disputes."' Masters granted
relief favorable to the gay or lesbian parent because the parent's lifestyle did not
adversely affect the children. Additionally, other unrelated factors weighed in such
parent's favor."' When relief was denied to the gay or lesbian parent, the Masters,
except for one case, cited reasons other than the lifestyle of the gay or lesbian parent
in their recommendations."
Gauging by the number of cases involving a gay or lesbian parent as
reported by the survey of Masters, it is likely the issue will again be the subject of
review by the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia. As such, the balance
of this Article analyzes current law in West Virginia to determine how the court
of the survey and 18 Masters responded.
107 Id Six of the 13 Masters have presided over two or more such cases. Only one Master has
presided over five or more such cases. Id.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 SURVEY OF MASTERS, supra note 106. Of the 13 Masters who have presided over a case
involving a homosexual parent, 22 cases involved a lesbian mother and six cases involved a gay father.
Id.
II Id. All responses combined, the Masters have heard 14 cases involving original divorce
proceedings and 14 modification actions. Id.
112 Id Of the 28 cases reported by the 13 Masters, 16 were favorable to the relief sought by the
gay or lesbian parent. SURVEY OF MASTERS, supra note 106. Of those 16 cases, four were settled by
agreement of the parties. Id.
113 Id. Of the 12 cases decided favorably to the relief sought by the heterosexual parent, five
were settled by agreement of the parties, six were based on factors other than the homosexual parents'
lifestyle, and one Master cited such lifestyle for the decision. Id.
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should decide the issue, and suggestions will be made for practitioners litigating this
unique type of dispute.
B. West Virginia Case Law
Barring a total retreat from existing case law in West Virginia, gay or
lesbian parents involved in a custody or visitation dispute should expect that the
issue of their lifestyle will be irrelevant unless coupled with demonstrable proof that
the lifestyle adversely impacts the children. The issue of what standard of review
should be applied in cases involving homosexual parents was settled in Rowsey v.
Rowsey.1
4
In Rowsey, the mother was awarded custody of her two minor children in
the initial divorce proceeding, but her custody was conditioned on her ceasing
contact with a known lesbian and limiting her right to take the children out of the
county (presumably to prevent further contact with the lesbian)."5 Subsequent to
the final divorce order, the father sought a change in custody based on his former
wife's continued relationship with the lesbian referred to in the divorce decree and
her travel outside the county with the children to visit with the lesbian." 6 Without
making any finding that the alleged change in circumstances adversely affected the
children, the trial court awarded custody to the father." 7
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia had no trouble in reversing
the trial court's decision. The West Virginia Supreme Court stated that "[a] change
of custody based on a speculative notion of potential harm is an impermissible
exercise of discretion."". Such an abuse of discretion mandated reversal since the
record was devoid of evidence documenting any adverse impact on the children
caused by the mother's continued relationship with the reputed lesbian or by her
travel outside the county to visit such lesbian." 9
114 329 S.E.2d 57, 61 (W. Va. 1985).
Hs Id. at 59. Neither party appealed the final divorce decree. Id.
116 Id. at 59-60.
"7 Id.
118 Rowsey, 329 S.E.2d. at 61.
119 Id. The court restored custody to the mother and removed the travel restriction unless it
could be shown that such restriction would serve the children's best interests. Id. at 62.
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The court's decision in Rowsey affirmed several prior decisions which
required a nexus between the parent's lifestyle or conduct and the alleged harm to
the children. 2' For example, in Porter v. Porter,' the court stated,
Our case law clearly indicates that a change of custody is not
justified where, as here, the only basis for the court's decision is
the existence of an extramarital relationship on the part of the
parent originally awarded custody. There must also be a showing
that the parent's relationship with another adult has a deleterious
effect upon the child and that the child will materially benefit from
the change of custody."
The rationale of Porter which dictates a nexus requirement has been adhered to
strictly in West Virginia. For example, in Moses v. Moses,"'3 the court held that "in
a domestic custody situation the focus of an examination of a parent's conduct is
not normally on whether the conduct is morally pure, but upon whether the conduct
has a deleterious effect upon the children."' 24
The court encountered a related issue involving a mother's extramarital
affair with a man, who was alleged to be previously involved in homosexual
relationship in the case of M.S.P. v. P.E.P.'2 Although the trial court in MS.P.
found the mother to be the primary caretaker of the parties' three and five year old
children, it nonetheless awarded custody to the father, finding the mother unfit
because of the "moral atmosphere which exists in the home of [the mother],
120 Id. at 60 (citing, e.g., Porter v. Porter, 298 S.E.2d 130 (W. Va. 1982)).
121 298 S.E.2d 130 (W. Va. 1982).
122 Id. at 132. See also S.H. v. R.L.H., 289 S.E.2d 186, Syl. Pt. 3 (W. Va. 1982) ("Where one
parent has been awarded the custody of minor children by the court and that parent either remarries
or undertakes a relationship with another adult who is either a permanent resident or regular overnight
visitor in the home, the remarriage or existence of such extramarital relationship constitutes a sufficient
change of circumstances to warrant a reexamination of child placement; however, neither remarriage
nor an extramarital relationship per se raises any presumption against continued custody in the parent
originally awarded such custody."). Id.
123 421 S.E.2d 506 (W. Va. 1992).
124 Id at 510. AccordKenneth L.W. v. Tamyra S.W., 408 S.E.2d 625, Syl. Pt. I (W. Va. 1991);
Goetz v. Carpenter, 367 S.E.2d 782, Syl. Pt. 3 (W. Va. 1988); Isaacs v. Isaacs, 358 S.E.2d 833 (W. Va.
1987); Bickler v. Bickler, 344 S.E.2d 630 (W. Va. 1986).
125 358 S.E.2d 442 (W. Va. 1987).
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resulting from visits of her close friends, who are bi-sexual or homosexual, [which]
does not appear to be a fit and proper place for the children to reside."', 6 The
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, which again had no trouble in
reversing the trial court because the record contained no evidence that the mother's
relationship with the alleged homosexual had a negative impact upon the children,
stated that "[a]dverse effects upon the children must be demonstrated before a
divorcing parent's subsequent associations, standing alone, can be the basis for
finding a parent who is the primary caretaker, unfit to have custody of her minor
children." '127
The nexus standard enunciated in Rowsey and MS.P. should continue as the
mode by which Masters and courts will decide future custody or visitation disputes
involving gay or lesbian parents.' This standard is an evidence-based test that
requires a factual finding of harm to a child before relief can be granted adverse to
the homosexual parent.29 Practitioners representing gay or lesbian parents should
nonetheless expect to encounter many of the same arguments 3' various courts have
relied upon to deny relief to such parents.
To counter the common fear that children raised by a homosexual parent
might themselves become homosexual, the practitioner should be prepared in
rebuttal to offer expert testimony by a psychologist or psychiatrist familiar with the
126 Id. at 444. The father who sought custody in M.S.P. admitted he had no evidence that any
unhealthy or immoral conduct occurred around his children. Id. at 445.
127 Id.
128 See, supra notes 106-113 and accompanying text. The results of the SURVEY OF MASTERS
supports this proposition. See supra notes 106-13 and accompanying text. Moreover, determinations
of child custody are guided by the best interests of the child, which demands that the decisions be
premised on competent evidence rather than unsubstantiated assumptions. See In re Custody of
Cottrill, 346 S.E.2d 47 (W. Va. 1986); Thomas v. Thomas, 327 S.E.2d 149, Syl. Pt. 2 (W. Va. 1985).
129 Arguably, the requirement of a nexus between the parent's sexual orientation and alleged
harm to a child should have increased force in a modification proceeding since West Virginia's
standard for modification favors maintaining stability for the child. That heightened evidentiary
standard for modification actions was set forth in Cloud v. Cloud, 239 S.E.2d 669, Syl. Pt. 2 (W. Va.
1977) ("To justify a change of child custody, in addition to a change in circumstances of the parties,
it must be shown that such change would materially promote the welfare of the child."). Accord
Phillips v. Phillips, 425 S.E.2d 834, Syl. Pt. 2 (W. Va. 1992).
130 See supra notes 84-104 and accompanying text.
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various studies and commentary that reject such a bias."' Similarly, the use of a
physician experienced in the treatment of HV/AIDS would be useful to dispel the
fear that the children might contract AIDS.'32 The argument raised in certain states
that a gay or lesbian parent is unfit because he or she engages in alleged criminal
conduct such as sodomy should be dismissed as without merit since West Virginia
abolished its sodomy statute in 1976 and replaced it with crimes defining sexual
assault or abuse (which would have no application between consenting adults).'
What defense, if any, that may be necessary to address the argument that
the homosexual parent's lifestyle affects the moral development of a child might be
determined from existing case law in West Virginia. In Kenneth L. W. v. Tamyra
S. .,3 the court reversed a trial court ruling which awarded custody of the parties'
minor children to the father based upon the unfitness of the mother. The mother
allegedly had affairs with another man, even though the evidence clearly showed
the mother was the primary caretaker.'35 The court stated that
in resolving a child custody issue, this Court will not concern itself
with the adulterous conduct of a parent absent a deleterious effect
upon the children. "[R]estrained normal sexual behavior does not
make a parent unfit. The law does not attend to traditional
131 See, e.g., Doe v. Doe, 452 N.E.2d 293 (Mass. App. Ct. 1983). In Doe, the court relied upon
testimony of three of the four psychiatrists who testified at trial that the lesbian mother's lifestyle, in
and of itself, would not adversely affect the minor child. The court specifically relied on one
psychiatrist's study comparing children of single parent heterosexual and single parent homosexual
households, finding "no difference in the minor children and no evidence of sexual dysfunction" of
the minor children in the homosexual parents' households. Id. at 296. See also Pleasant v. Pleasant
628 N.E.2d 633 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993). In Pleasant, the court rejected a psychiatrist's fear that the child
might be confused about gender roles and his own sexual identity due to the mother's lesbianism, since
the psychiatrist failed to testify that the child in fact had a gender role identity problem. Id at 641-42.
132 See, e.g., Stewart v. Stewart, 521 N.E.2d 956 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988) (refusing to restrict a
HIV-positive father's visitation since expert medical testimony presented at trial established that AIDS
was not transmitted through everyday household contact); Jane W. v. John W., 519 N.Y.S.2d 603
(App. Div. 1987) (relying heavily on the father's treating physician that the possible transmittal of
AIDS did not require limitations on his visitations); Conkel v. Conkel, 509 N.E.2d 983 (Ohio Ct. App.
1987) (granting overnight visitation privileges to a homosexual father and relying on studies that AIDS
or other HIV-associated diseases are not contracted by casual household contact).
133 See W. VA. CODE § 61-8B-1 to -18 (1997) (enacted 1976). Lack of consent resulting either
from forcible compulsion or incapacity to consent is an element of every offense of sexual assault or
abuse. Id.
134 408 S.E.2d 625 (W. Va. 1991).
135 Id. at 630.
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concepts of immorality in the abstract, but only to whether the
child is a party to, or is influenced by, such behavior."'36
In focusing the inquiry of morality upon whether the children are affected, the court
in Kenneth L. W. was relying on the settled rule that a parent's sexual misconduct
will not be considered as evidence of unfitness unless it is "so aggravated, given
contemporary moral standards, that reasonable men would find [the] immorality,
per se, warrant[s] a finding of unfitness because of the deleterious effect upon the
child of being raised by [such a parent]."' 7
Although the decision in Kenneth L. W. may not be clear as to what
constitutes aggravated conduct of immorality that would warrant aper se finding
of unfitness, the decision in Kenneth L. W. makes it abundantly clear that before
such a finding can be made, it must be coupled with a showing that such immorality
has a deleterious impact upon the child.'38 Thus, the argument regarding the moral
development of the child can be defeated by showing, for example, that the
homosexual parent's sexual practices are kept discreet in the same manner that a
court would disregard an attack upon the morals of a heterosexual parent engaging
in nonmarital sexual conduct that does not adversely impact the children. However,
where such conduct adversely influences the children, the practitioner can expect
the court or Master to consider the same in a fitness determination of the parent. 39
136 Id, at 628, citing Richard Neely, The Primary Caretaker Parent Rule, Child Custody and the
Dynamics of Greed, 3 YALE L. & POL'YREV. 168, 181 (1984).
137 Kenneth L. W., 408 S.E.2d at 628 (citing David M. v. Margaret M., 385 S.E.2d 912, Syl. Pt.
7 (W. VA. 1989)). Accord Moses v. Moses, 421 S.E.2d 506, Syl. Pt. 3 (W. Va. 1992); Dottie S. v.
Christopher S., 408 S.E.2d 46, Syl. Pt. 2 (W. Va. 1991); J.B. v. A.B., 242 S.E.2d 248, Syl. Pt. 4 (W.
VA. 1978), modified Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 363 (W. Va. 1981).
138 In Tucker v. Tucker, 881 P.2d 948 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), the court made a similar ruling to
that of the West Virginia court in Kenneth L. W, when it stated that while it questioned a lesbian
mother's lack of moral example for her child by exposing the child to her lesbianism, the same was not
linked with the mother's ability to nurture her child or to be a supportive parent, and was therefore not
a ground to deny her custody. Id at 954. Declaring a parent unfit, whether based on aper se finding
due to aggravated conduct of immorality or upon other grounds, is not an easy task in West Virginia
given the heightened level of evidence required to make such a finding. In order to separate a child
from its parent on the ground of unfitness of the parent, there must be cogent and convincing proof of
that fact. State ex. rel. Kiger v. Hancock, 168 S.E.2d 798, 801 (W. Va. 1969).
139 See supra notes 102-104 and accompanying text (discussing conduct of a homosexual parent
that adversely impacted the minor children). The issue of the morality of children's exposure to the
lifestyle of their homosexual parent was at least implicitly laid to rest by the court in M.S.P. v. P.E.P.,
358 S.E.2d 442 (W. Va. 1987) (rejecting the trial court's finding that the mother's household, which
included her male homosexual friend, was not morally fit). See supra notes 125-127 and
[Vol. 100:107
26
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 100, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 9
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol100/iss1/9
CHILD CUSTODY RIGHTS
It is unlikely that a practitioner representing a gay or lesbian parent will
have to seriously address the argument that the minor children might be stigmatized
by such a parent's lifestyle. Even if evidence is presented that the minor children
have been teased or harassed by others regarding their parent's lifestyle, it is hoped
that no Master or court will countenance such bigotry by denying or restricting
custody or visitation upon such ground.14 In addition to the preceding suggestions
on how to address the various arguments a gay or lesbian parent might encounter,
counsel may also wish to enlist the assistance of various organizations concerned
with the rights of gay and lesbian parents.'
accompanying text.
140 SURVEY OF MASTERS, supra note 106. Of those Masters who made a recommendation
denying or restricting the custody or visitation rights of a gay or lesbian parent, not one Master
responded to the question that one of their reasons for such a decision was that the children would be
stigmatized by society due to their parent's lifestyle. See also, supra notes 17-21 and accompanying
text.
141 See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 10, at 148, where the author lists key support groups that may
intervene at the trial level or on appeal, including the following:
Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund
666 Broadway, 12th Floor
NewYork,NY 10012
(212) 995-8585
National Center for Lesbian Rights
870 Market Street, Suite 570
San Francisco, CA 94102
(415) 392-6257
Lesbian Mothers National Defense Fund
P.O. Box 21567
Seattle, WA 98111
(206) 325-2643
Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders
P.O. Box 218
Boston, MA 02112
(617) 426-1350
Gay & Lesbian Parents Coalition International
P.O. Box 50360
Washington, D.C. 20004
(202) 583-8029
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IV. CONCLUSION
Courts across the nation have employed various standards of review to child
custody or visitation disputes involving a gay or lesbian parent. A minority of
courts employ the rigid per se analysis, which appears to be based upon nothing
more than rank homophobic fears. These courts deny gay or lesbian litigants the
opportunity to show their lifestyles do not adversely impact their children nor
hinder their parenting abilities.
Fortunately, the vast majority of jurisdictions reject the narrow-minded per
se approach and at a minimum allow a gay or lesbian parent to rebut with evidence
any presumption that their lifestyle harms or may harm their children. Beyond
those states which employ such a middle ground analysis (i.e., a rebuttable
presumption approach) are the growing number of states which require a nexus
between the homosexual parent's lifestyle and the alleged harm to the child before
such lifestyle becomes a relevant consideration in the dispute.
West Virginia is one of those enlightened jurisdictions, and its
long-standing precedent requiring the nexus standard bodes well for the gay or
lesbian parent faced with a claim that his or her lifestyle is somehow relevant as to
their parenting abilities. The requirement of demonstrable proof of harm to the
child as a result of the homosexual parent's lifestyle, and not mere speculation or
unfounded fears of harm, will defeat frivolous claims. The nexus standard serves
the best interests of the child, and heterosexual parents concerned with their child's
development will be protected where they can show their children are harmed by
the nontraditional lifestyle of the gay or lesbian parent.
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APPENDIX
CLASSIFICATION OF STATES' DECISION-MAKING FRAMEWORK
IN CHILD CUSTODY AND VISITATION
DISPUTES INVOLVING A GAY OR LESBIAN PARENT
I. STATES FOLLOWING PER SE ANALYSIS (Seven States)
A. KENTUCKY: S. v. S., 608 S.W.2d 64 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980), cert.
denied sub. nom., Stevenson v. Stevenson, 451 U.S. 911 (1981).
B. MISSISSIPPI: White v. Thompson, 569 So. 2d 1181 (Miss. 1990).
C. MISSOURI: J.P. v. P.W., 772 S.W.2d 786 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
Accord G.A. v. D.A., 745 S.W.2d 726 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); S.E.G.
v. R.A.G., 735 S.W.2d 164 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); J.L.P.(H.) v.
D.J.P., 643 S.W.2d 865 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); L. v. D., 630 S.W.2d
240 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); N.K.M. v. L.E.M., 606 S.W.2d 179 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1980). But cf T.C.H. v. K.M.H., 784 S.W.2d 281 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1989).
D. NEVADA: Daly v. Daly, 715 P.2d 56 (Nev. 1986).
E. NORTH CAROLINA: Newsome v. Newsome, 256 S.E.2d 849
(N.C. Ct. App. 1979). But cf. Woodruff v. Woodruff, 260 S.E.2d
775 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979).
F. TENNESSEE: Dailey v. Dailey, 635 S.W.2d 391 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1981).
G. VIRGINIA: Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691 (Va. 1985). See also
Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102 (Va. 1995).
II. STATES REJECTING PER SE, BUT NOT SPECIFICALLY ADOPTING
NEXUS APPROACH (Eight States)
A. ALABAMA: H.J.B v. P.W., 628 So. 2d 753 (Ala. Civ. App. 1993)
(best interests analysis applied).
B. ARIZONA: In re Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Action
B-10489, 727 P.2d 830 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (sexual orientation
to be reviewed as one of many factors).
C. ARKANSAS: Thigpen v. Carpenter, 730 S.W.2d 510 (Ark. Ct.
App. 1987) (rebuttable presumption applied).
D. MICHIGAN: Irish v. Irish, 300 N.W.2d 739 (Mich. Ct. App.
1981); Hall v. Hall, 291 N.W.2d 143 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980).
E. NORTH DAKOTA: Jacobson v. Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d 78 (N.D.
1981) (rebuttable presumption applied). But cf Johnson v.
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Schlotman, 502 N.W.2d 831 (N.D. 1993) (nexus approach
implicitly used but Jacobson not overruled or distinguished).
F. OKLAHOMA: M.J.P. v. J.G.P., 640 P.2d 966 (Okla. 1982)
(rebuttable presumption applied).
G. OREGON: Ashling v. Ashling, 599 P.2d 475 (Or. 1979) (sexual
orientation to be reviewed as one of many factors). See also A. v.
A., 514 P.2d 358 (Or. App. 1973).
H. PENNSYLVANIA: Blew v. Verta, 617 A.2d 31 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1992) (best interests analysis applied). But cf. Barron v. Barron,
594 A.2d 682 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991); Constant A. v. Paul C.A., 496
A.2d 1 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (rebuttable presumption applied).
III. STATES FOLLOWING NEXUS APPROACH (25 States)
A. ALASKA: S.N.E. v. R.L.B., 699 P.2d 875 (Alaska 1985).
B. CALIFORNIA: In re Marriage of Birdsall, 197 243 Cal. Rptr. 287
(1988). Accord Nadler v. Superior Court, 63 Cal. Rptr. 352 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1967).
C. COLORADO: Christian v. Randall, 516 P.2d 132 (Colo. Ct. App.
1973).
D. CONNECTICUT: Charpentier v. Charpentier, 536 A.2d 948
(Conn. 1988).
E. FLORIDA: In re Pearlman, No. 87-24926 DA (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct.
1989), cited in Dept. of Health & Rehab. Serv. v. Cox, 627 So. 2d
1210, 1222 (Fla. App. 2 Dist. 1993). Accord Maradie v. Maradie,
680 So.2d 538 (Fla. 1996).
F. GEORGIA: Gay v. Gay, 253 S.E.2d 846 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979);
Buck v. Buck, 233 S.E.2d 792 (Ga. 1977); In the Interest of
R.E.W., 471 S.E.2d 6 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996). But cf Vanderels v.
Vanderels, Civ. File No. 85-DR-3445-2 (Ga. Super. 1987) (holding
that a mother's lesbianism constituted material change in
circumstances affecting child's welfare warranting change in
custody).
G. ILLINOIS: In re Marriage of Martins, 645 N.E.2d 567 (I11. App.
Ct. 1995), appeal den. 649 N.E.2d 418. Accord Pleasants v.
Pleasants, 628 N.E.2d 633 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) and In re Marriage
of Williams, 563 N.E.2d 1195 (ill. App. Ct. 1990). But cf. In re
Diehl, 18 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 1128 (Ill. App. Ct. 2 Dist., No.
2-90-1217, 11-22-91).
[Vol. 100:107
30
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 100, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 9
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol100/iss1/9
CHILD CUSTODY RIGHTS
H. INDIANA: Teegarden v. Teegarden, 642 N.E.2d 1007 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1994). See also D.H. V. J.H., 418 N.E.2d 286 (Ind. Ct. App.
1981); Stewart v. Stewart, 521 N.E.2d 956 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988).
I. IOWA: Hodson v. Moore, 464 N.W.2d 699 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990).
Accord In re Marriage of Walsh, 451 N.W.2d 492 (Iowa 1990).
J. LOUISIANA: Lundin v. Lundin, 563 So. 2d 1273 (La. Ct. App.
1990). Accord Peyton v. Peyton, 457 So. 2d 321 (La. Ct. App.
1984).
K. MAINE: Whitehead v. Black, 2 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2593 (Maine
Super. Ct. Cumberland Cty., 6-14-76).
L. MARYLAND: North v. North,648 A.2d 1025 (Md. Ct. Sp. App.
1994).
M. MASSACHUSETTS: Bezio v. Patenaude, 410 N.E.2d 1207
(Mass. 1980). Accord Doe v. Doe, 452 N.E.2d 293 (Mass. App.
Ct. 1983).
N. MINNESOTA: McKay v. Johnson, No. C6-95-1696, available in
1996 WL 12658 (Minn. Ct. App.).
0. NEW JERSEY: M.P. v. S.P., 404 A.2d 1256 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1979). Accord In re J.S. & C., 486, 324 A.2d 90 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Ch. Div. 1974), aff'd, 362 A.2d 54 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1976).
P. NEW MEXICO: In re Jacinta M., 764 P.2d 1327 (N.M. Ct. App.
1988).
Q. NEW YORK: M.A.B. v. R.B., 510 N.Y.S.2d 960 (N.Y. 1986).
Accord Jane W. v. John W., 519 N.Y.S.2d 603 (N.Y. App. Div.
1987); Gottlieb v. Gottlieb, 488 N.Y.S.2d 180 (App. Div. 1985);
Guinan v. Guinan, 477 N.Y.S.2d 830 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984);
DiStefano v. DiStefano, 401 N.Y.S.2d 636 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978).
R. OHIO: In re Charles B., 552 N.E.2d 884 (Ohio 1990). Accord
Morham v. Morham, 565 N.E.2d 1283 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989);
Conkel v. Conkel, 509 N.E.2d 983 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987). But cf
Roberts v. Roberts, 489 N.E.2d 1067 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985); Glover
v. Glover, 586 N.E.2d 159 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990).
S. SOUTH CAROLINA: Stroman v. Williams, 353 S.E.2d 704 (S.C.
Ct. App. 1987).
T. SOUTH DAKOTA: Van Driel v. Van Driel, 525 N.W.2d 37 (S.D.
1994). But cf Chicoine v. Chicoine, 479 N.W.2d 891 (S.D. 1992).
U. UTAH: Tucker v. Tucker, 881 P.2d 948 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
But cf Kallas v. Kallas, 614 P.2d 641 (Utah 1980) (finding that
sexual orientation is a relevant consideration among all factors).
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Y. VERMONT: Medeiros v. Medeiros, 8 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2372
(Vt. Super. Ct. 1982). See generally, In re Estate of Hamilton, No.
24,951 (Vt. Prob. Ct., Washington Cty., 7-25-89).
W. WASHINGTON: In re Cabalquinto, 718 P.2d 7 (Wash. Ct. App.
1986). Accord Schuster v. Schuster, 585 P.2d 130 (Wash. 1978).
X. WEST VIRGINIA: Rowsey v. Rowsey, 329 S.E.2d 57 (W. Va.
1985); M.S.P. v. P.E.P., 358 S.E.2d 442 (W. Va. 1987).
Y. WYOMING: Hertzler v. Hertzler, 908 P.2d 946 (Wyo. 1995).
IV. STATES WHICH HAVE NOT ADDRESSED THE ISSUE (10 States)
A. DELAWARE: See generally, Gerald & Margaret D. v. Peggy R.,
File No. C-9104, Pet. No. 79-12-143-CV (Del. Fam. Ct. 1980)
(finding that a trial court considered negatively the grandparents
inability to accept mother's lesbian in case involving grandparents
seeking custody from mother); see also, A.S. v. M.S., 435 A.2d
721, 725-26 (Del. 1981) (holding a court can consider moral
development of child and the burden lies with custodial parent to
show noncustodial parent's nonmarital relationship affects the
child's moral development).
B. HAWAII: Baehr v. Miike, FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2001, available in
1996 WL 694235 (Hawaii Cir. Ct. 1st Cir., No. 91-1394, 12/3/96)
(invalidating that state's law prohibiting gay or lesbian couples
from securing marriage licenses).
C. IDAHO: Roeh v. Roeh, 746 P.2d 1016, 1019 (Idaho Ct. App.
1987) cited with approval in Craig v. McBride, 639 P.2d 303
(Alaska 1982) (finding that evidence of a parent's lifestyle, habits,
and character is relevant if shown to adversely affect the child).
D. KANSAS: Hardenburger v. Hardenburger, 532 P.2d 1106 (Kan.
1975) (finding that a mother's allegations that father was a
homosexual not supported in the record).
E. MONTANA: See Deirdre Larkin Runnette, Comment, Judicial
Discretion and the Homosexual Parent: How Montana Courts Are
and Should be Considering a Parent's Sexual Orientation in
Contested Custody Cases, 57 MONT. L. REv. 177 (1996) (noting
that no reported decision beyond that of their trial court level
addresses the issue and which reviews Montana decisions
indicating that a nexus approach should be employed). See also In
re Marriage of D.F.D. and D.G.D., 862 P.2d 368 (Mont. 1993)
(holding that allegations that a father cross-dressed in past not a
valid basis to deny him joint custody).
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F. NEBRASKA: Smith-Helstrom v. Yonker, 544 N.W.2d 93(Neb.
1996) (holding that a mother's violation of a decree prohibiting her
from cohabiting with men to whom she was not married did not
outweigh the child's best interests as there was no showing the
cohabitation adversely affected her child). See also Christen v.
Christen, 422 N.W.2d 92, 95 (Neb. 1988) (citing NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 42-364(l)(1996)) (holding that in determining a child's best
interests in a custody case, a court can consider the moral fitness
of the child's parents, including the parent's sexual conduct, as
well as the parent's proposed living environment).
G. NEW HAMPSHIRE: See Opinion of the Justices, 530 A.2d 21
(N.H. 1987) (upholding New Hampshire's state law barring
adoptions to homosexuals).
H. RHODE ISLAND: (no relevant cases found).
I. TEXAS: Kelly v. Kline, 827 S.W.2d 609 (Tex. App. 1992)
(denying a lesbian mother an attempt to invalidate consent order
transferring custody to father); Baker v. Woods, 553 F.Supp. 1121
(N.D. Texas 1982), rev'don other grounds, 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986) (invalidating state's
sodomy law upon petition by a homosexual).
J. WISCONSIN: Dinges v. Montgomery, 514 N.W.2d 723 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1993) (finding no detriment to child being in lesbian mother's
household; case is of limited precedential value). See Gould v.
Gould, 342 N.W.2d 426,431-32 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984) (stating that
a parent's nontraditional lifestyle or extramarital relationship is
relevant only upon a stated connection between the parent's
relationship or moral-social values and some present demonstrative
harm to the child's best interests.). Accord Schwantes v.
Schwantes, 360 N.W.2d 69 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984).
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